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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Nielsen is entitled to two uninsured motorist (UM) coverages 
under his policy with Metropolitan. The very provision present in 
the Nielsen policy has been found ambiguous by other courts. 
Additionally, Richard Nielsen's testimony as to his reasonable 
expectations of two coverages was uncontroverted in the lower 
court, and is supported by the case law and commentary. 
Metropolitan's attempt to refute Nielsen's testimony creates, at 
best, a factual issue to be decided by a jury. 
Nielsen is also entitled to coverage under the $500,000 limit 
for "each accident." The language in question is vague and fails 
to define the critical term relied upon by Metropolitan. 
Furthermore, Metropolitan uses that term to mean different things 
both in its brief and elsewhere in the policy. Accordingly, the 
language is ambiguous and must be construed in Nielsen's favor. 
Metropolitan cannot establish that Nielsen knowingly and 
voluntarily relinquished his right to claim coverage under the 
"each accident" limit, and thus Nielsen has not waived his right to 
make that argument. At the very least, the district court must 
make specific findings as to whether such a waiver occurred. 
Because Metropolitan's obligation to Nielsen is contractual, 
Nielsen is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the entire amount 
of the obligation. Metropolitan's attempt to characterize 
1 
Nielsen's claim for coverage as a personal injury action is 
contrary to this Court's own pronouncements that the UM coverage 
relationship is based upon contract. As with other contract 
disputes, the fact that Metropolitan disputed the extent of its 
liability does not preclude imposition of pre-judgment interest. 
In the alternative, Nielsen is entitled to pre-judgment 
interest on the amount of his special damages. Metropolitan's 
opposition to this point is based upon an unrealistic 
interpretation of the term "damages" as used in the policy. 
Furthermore, case law supports the award of pre-judgment interest 
where an insurance company knows or should know that the insured is 
entitled to be paid policy limits but refuses to tender that 
amount. It is at the very least a factual issue. Finally, the 
award of pre-judgment interest is statutorily mandated, and thus 
Metropolitan cannot avoid payment through contrary contractual 
provision. 
ARGUMENT 
Objection To New Evidence Submitted On Appeal By Respondent 
Metropolitan has attached to its brief an affidavit of 
Metropolitan's counsel, including exhibits, which was not presented 
in the court below. The affidavit appears for the first time in 
Metropolitan's brief. Under well-established principles of 
appellate review, Metropolitan cannot rely upon material never 
2 
presented to the district court in attempting to support the lower 
courts order of summary judgment. Pilcher v. Department of Social 
Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). 
It should also be noted that the new material is offered by 
Metropolitan to refute the evidence adduced below as to Richard 
Nielsen's reasonable expectations. Metropolitan's effort is 
inappropriate for three reasons. First, the district court was 
required to view the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to Nielsen. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). Second, the evidence as to Nielsen's 
reasonable expectations was uncontroverted in the lower court. 
Metropolitan was obligated at the trial court to submit countering 
affidavits or other evidence in response to Nielsen's affidavit. 
U.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Metropolitan's failure to do so warranted the 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Nielsen. Third, it would be 
a dangerous precedent to allow a party in a civil case to submit 
new evidence on appeal. No judgment below would ever be factually 
final and all parties would have incentive to bolster their 
position on appeal with new evidence. 
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I. THE NIELSEN POLICY HAS TWO LIMITS OF 
$250,000/500,000 FOR UM COVERAGE. 
A. The policy language in question permits stacking. 
Metropolitan characterizes the issue in Point I as whether the 
district court correctly ruled "that stacking of uninsured motorist 
benefits was not allowed in Utah." The actual issue, however, is 
whether the language in the particular policy purchased by Richard 
Nielsen in 1982 permits stacking of the uninsured motorist 
coverages provided in the policy. 
The principle case relied upon by Metropolitan supports the 
conclusion that the availability of stacking (prior to enactment of 
the anti-stacking statute in 1985) hinges on the particular policy 
language at issue. In Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 
P.2d 294 (1969), this Court determined that, under the terms of the 
particular policy construed, stacking of UM coverages was properly 
denied: 
There appears to be no ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
provision just quoted. It being thus set forth as part 
of the insurance contract, in clear and understandable 
terms, that where the Company has issued more than one 
policy to an insured, it will be liable only up to the 
maximum coverage of its highest limit on any one policy 
for any one accident or loss, it is the duty of the 
courts to give it effect. 
Id., 454 P.2d at 295. 
Contrary to Metropolitan's assertion, Martin does not bar 
stacking regardless of the policy language. Instead, it is 
4 
apparent from the Court's opinion that the availability of stacking 
depended upon the specific language present in the policy, which, 
in Martin, the Court found unambiguous. 
The anti-stacking provision of Martin expressly applied to 
"any other insurance policy or policies issued to the insured by 
the company . . . " Id. at 295. The plaintiff in that case had 
purchased two separate insurance policies. It is not difficult to 
see why this Court found no ambiguity. 
Metropolitan suggests that the language in the Nielsen policy 
is "virtually identical" to that in Martin. However, Metropolitan 
quotes the wrong section of the insurance policy to support this 
assertion. The provision in Nielsen7s policy governing "other 
insurance" in the uninsured motorist context is found in a section 
labeled OTHER INSURANCE. (Policy, p. 12) . Metropolitan ignores 
this provision in the UM section, preferring to have this Court 
construe the "other insurance" provision in the general conditions 
section. Metropolitan does not refute Nielsens analysis of the UM 
provision. As demonstrated below, the clause is ambiguous. 
Metropolitan seeks to limit UM coverage based upon what it 
claims to be other available insurance.1 The "other insurance11 
1
 The applicable UM provision was quoted and discussed at 
length in Nielsen's opening brief, but is completely ignored by 
Metropolitan in its Brief. Metropolitan provides no explanation 
for why the UM "other insurance" provision is in the policy if the 
issue is actually supposed to be governed by the general conditions 
5 
provision in the UM section has two separate subdivisions, one 
labeled "Automobile Liability and Automobile Medical Expense 
Coverages" and the other labeled "Protection Against Uninsured 
Motorists Coverage." Only the latter section specifically 
addresses the present case. The first paragraph of this provision 
states: 
Protection Against Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying a highway vehicle not owned by the named 
insured, the insurance under the Protection Against 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage shall apply only as excess 
insurance over any other similar insurance available to 
such insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary 
insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in 
the amount by which the limit of liability for this 
coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of 
such other insurance. 
In this case, the Nielsens were not occupying a vehicle owned 
by another when the accident occurred. Accordingly, the second 
paragraph of the provision comes into play: 
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if 
the insured has other similar insurance available to him 
and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be 
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits 
of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, 
section. Moreover, even if the paragraph cited by Metropolitan did 
encompass UM coverage within its scope, the policy language 
expressly governing UM coverage is controlling, as a clarification 
or modification of the more general provision cited by 
Metropolitan. United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, 681 P.2d 390, 425-26 (Ariz.App. 1983); Waterway 
Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors, 406 P.2d 556, 
566 (Ore. 1965, en banc); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
203(c). 
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and METROPOLITAN shall not be liable for a greater 
proportion of any loss to which this Protection Against 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage applies than the limit of 
liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable 
limits of liability of this insurance and such other 
insurance. 
This "other insurance" provision is quite dissimilar to the 
applicable provision in Martin. The identical provision has been 
found ambiguous by other courts, including U. S. District Court 
Judge Aldon J. Anderson in Ainae v. Allstate Insurance Co., Civ. 
No. C-80-211A (July 21, 1981). In Ainge, Judge Anderson rejected 
the construction of Martin advocated by Metropolitan, noting that 
the language of the policy in the latter case expressly applied to 
other policies issued "by the Company." In contrast, a policy 
without such language was ambiguous as to the effect of the 
additional premiums. (Ainge at 4, R. 387). An ambiguous provision 
cannot satisfy the requirement that an insurer wishing to limit 
coverage must do so through "exclusions phrased in language which 
clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific 
circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be 
provided." Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 786 P.2d 763, 765 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The Arkansas Supreme Court, also construing an identical 
provision, reached the same conclusion in Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Arkansas v. Barnhill. 681 S.W.2d 341 (Ark. 
1984) . The court held that, unlike an "other insurance" clause 
7 
which states it applies to other insurance provided "by the 
company," an insured could not be expected to realize that "other 
similar insurance" means "the very policy he is reading." Id. at 
342.2 
Thus, while the Nielsen policy provision governing dual 
coverages in the UM context has not been construed by a Utah 
appellate court, the identical provision has been found ambiguous 
by other courts. As the Court of Appeals has noted, that fact 
alone suggests the existence of an ambiguity. Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Co. v. Finlayson. 751 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 
1988), vacated as moot, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989). At the very 
least, it cannot be said that such a provision is clear and 
unmistakable. 
The general rule in Utah is that payment of a premium 
establishes prima facie entitlement to coverage. Peterson v. 
Western Casualty and Surety Co., 19 Utah 2d 26, 29, 425 P.2d 769, 
770 (1967). The language of the Nielsen policy contains nothing to 
2
 The same problem is presented even by the policy language 
relied upon by Metropolitan. The language says, "With respect to 
any occurrence, accident or loss to which this and any other 
automobile insurance policy issued to the named insured by 
METROPOLITAN also applies, the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S 
liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest 
applicable limit of liability or benefit amount under any one such 
policy." (Underlined emphasis added). Again, it is not reasonable 
to argue that "any other policy" means the very policy the insured 
is reading. 
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contradict that rule with respect to payment of the second premium. 
Consequently, Nielsen's motion for summary judgment should have 
been granted, and the district court erred in entering judgment in 
favor of Metropolitan. 
B. At the very least, the district court's order erroneously 
disregarded factual issues as to Richard Nielsen's reasonable 
expectations. 
In addition to the ambiguity in the policy, Nielsen argued 
below that he is entitled to two coverages because of his 
reasonable expectations in paying two premiums. An insured's 
reasonable expectations may override even a clear exclusion in the 
policy. Wagner. at 766. Nielsen filed an affidavit explaining 
that payment of two premiums created an expectation in him of 
receiving two coverages. (R. 393-94). This uncontroverted 
affidavit was before the district court, and created at least a 
factual issue which the court could not resolve through summary 
judgment. 
Metropolitan now asks this Court to resolve the factual issue 
as well, arguing in its brief with new evidence that Nielsen did 
not really have an expectation of two coverages. As noted in the 
Objection above, Metropolitan's argument is based on inappropriate 
evidence which is not in the record. Metropolitan did not raise 
the argument in the lower court and therefore cannot raise it now 
9 
for the first time. Bundv v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984). 
Metropolitan's argument concerning Nielsen's reasonable 
expectations has another basic flaw. Metropolitan cites various 
documents for the proposition that Nielsen actually believed the 
limits were only $250,000, but none of the documents arose in a 
discussion of the insurance company's liability under the policy. 
These were settlement negotiations and Nielsen knew that 
Metropolitan would never settle for more than what it considered to 
be the policy limit of $250,000. The issue was not resolved before 
the trial. In spite of the Nielsens' serious injuries, 
Metropolitan had made clear that it did not intend to offer even 
the $250,000. Consequently, it did not matter whether or when 
Nielsen raised the issue of the insurance Metropolitan's actual 
liability under the policy. 
It should be noted, however, that Nielsen's uncontroverted 
testimony as to his reasonable expectations is supported not only 
by the cases cited, but by an authority in automobile insurance, 
who explains: 
Since uninsured motorist coverage, unlike liability 
coverage, is linked to the person rather than an 
automobile, it is not necessary for uninsured motorist 
coverage that a motor vehicle insured in the policy be 
involved in the accident. Coverage is available to an 
insured while occupying any motor vehicle, whether owned 
or nonowned, insured or uninsured, or while the insured 
is afoot or on horseback. 
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As a result of this type of "portable" coverage, the 
owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for 
coverage applicable to only one of them secures coverage 
for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured 
vehicles as well as the insured vehicle. Thus, when he 
pays separate and uniform premiums for vehicles #2 and 
#3, he reasonably expects — and it is a fair inference -
- that he has purchased additional coverages coextensive 
with and supplementing the insurance already available 
under a single coverage. 
Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance - No-Fault 
Insurance, Uninsured Motorists, Compulsory Coverage, Clark 
Boardman, 2nd ed. 1991, Vol. 3, § 31.02[8], p. 31-18.1.3 
(underlined emphasis added). Sufficient evidence therefore exists 
to support the conclusion that Nielsen's reasonable expectations 
entitle him to two coverages. 
Metropolitan apparently relies upon Martin to argue that an 
insured cannot have reasonable expectations of two coverages even 
when two premiums are paid. The issue of separate premiums arose 
in Martin only in conjunction with arguments that the insurer had 
waived the limiting provision, and that the financial 
responsibility laws mandated minimum coverage for each premium. 
The concept of reasonable expectations was never raised or 
3
 The premium for uninsured motorist coverage for the second 
vehicle in Nielsen's policy was slightly lower than for the first 
vehicle. As Schirmer notes, however, "[e]ven the payment of a 
lesser premium for Vehicles #2 and #3 is not in and of itself 
significant. This may simply reflect the saving in administrative 
expense involved in writing one policy rather than several." id, 
at p. 31-19. 
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addressed. In fact, the doctrine was not formally recognized in 
Utah until more than 20 years later. See Wagner, supra. 
Metropolitan also argues that "any lay person" could see that 
stacking is not allowed under the policy. Metropolitans assertion 
is directly refuted by (or insulting to) Judge Anderson and the 
highest court in another jurisdiction, both of whom found this very 
policy language ambiguous. 
C. Summary. 
Metropolitan's argument that stacking was prohibited jln toto 
is not supported by any of this Court's pronouncements. Prior to 
the anti-stacking statute, the availability of stacking is governed 
by the language of the specific policy. In this case, the specific 
provision governing UM coverage has been found ambiguous by at 
least two other courts. Accordingly, Metropolitan is liable under 
the policy for two coverages. 
Nielsen's entitlement to two coverages is also supported by 
the uncontroverted evidence of Nielsen's reasonable expectations. 
In addition to Nielsen's own testimony, other courts and 
commentators have recognized that an insured's reasonable 
expectations in paying two premiums for uninsured motorist coverage 
is to receive two coverages.4 
4
 Citing the subsequently enacted anti-stacking statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(6), Metropolitan "assumes" this court "will 
not take a stance in contravention with [sic] the legislature." 
12 
For those reasons, the district court7s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Metropolitan should be reversed, and the case 
remanded with instructions to enter judgment entitling Nielsen to 
two coverages of $250,000/500,000 each. 
II. NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO THE "EACH 
ACCIDENT" LIMIT OP $500/000 FOR EACH 
COVERAGE. 
Nielsen submits that the "each person/each accident" language 
in the policy is ambiguous, and Nielsen is therefore entitled to 
recover under the $500,000 "each accident" limit of coverage. In 
its brief, Metropolitan criticizes Nielsen for not citing any cases 
involving identical policy language, but Metropolitan also fails to 
cite any such cases. Of course, a logical explanation is that most 
policies are more explicit in explaining the each person/each 
accident concept. Two such policies are construed in the cases 
cited by Metropolitan, also discussed in Nielsen7s opening brief. 
While Metropolitan does not quote the exact language at issue 
in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733 (Wash. 1986), 
it assures this Court that it is "substantially similar" to that in 
That assertion implies that this Court will not conduct an 
independent review of the law as it stood when Nielsen7s 
entitlement arose, but will construe the law to comport with the 
subsequent legislation. That notion is in conflict with the well-
established rule that a party has a right to rely upon the 
substantive law in effect at time a cause of action accrues. 
Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah 1987). 
13 
the Nielsen policy. However, the policy in Ostenson actually read 
"subject to this limit for 'each person' . . . " (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, the policy construed in Standard Accident Insurance 
Company of Detroit v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952) provided: 
"Subject to the above provision respecting each person . . . "5 The 
Nielsen policy neither refers to a "limit" or to "each person" 
language. 
Plainly, the drafters of the policies quoted above knew how to 
make clear to a reasonable insured just what the per accident limit 
was "subject to." In this case, however, the policy utilizes a 
non-specific statement that the each-accident provision is subject 
to "this provision," but does not define what "this provision" is. 
In response to that contention, Metropolitan explains that 
"provision" is the same thing as "clause." (Metropolitan's Brief, 
p. 19) (sentence consists of "two separate clauses or provisions"; 
"two clauses or provisions.") Yet Metropolitan itself uses, both 
in its brief and in the policy, the word "provision" to express 
various concepts that are beyond a mere "clause." For example, 
Metropolitan's brief applies the word "provision" to entire 
sentences or paragraphs. (See Metropolitan's brief, pp. 7, 16, 18, 
2 0-21, 31-32). In fact, Metropolitan refers to the entire 
5
 In its brief, Metropolitan underscores the words "subject 
to the above provision," ignoring the following words "respecting 
each person." (Metropolitan's Brief, p. 21.) 
14 
limitation section at issue as the "limiting provision." 
(Metropolitan's Brief, p. 18.) 
The word "provision" also is given several different meanings 
within the policy itself. For example, pages 2 and 3 of the policy 
refer to "the provisions of" a financial responsibility law and 
"the provisions of" any other no-fault law. On page 3, the policy, 
discussing duplicative policies, refers the reader to "the 
provisions of the policy providing the highest dollar limit of 
benefits payable." In that context, Metropolitan apparently meant 
"provisions" to refer to the entire text of a policy. 
In a subsequent section, the policy also makes reference to 
"the provisions of" premises insurance, worker's compensation or 
disability benefits law, and personal injury protection benefits, 
all in the same sentence. (Policy, p. 10). Later in the policy, 
reference is made to "the provisions of this policy relating to 
appraisal and time of payment and of bringing suit," again 
apparently referring to entire sections. (Policy, p. 19). As an 
additional example, the final paragraph of the policy states that 
the insured and Metropolitan agreed to be bound "by any award made 
by the arbitrator(s) pursuant to this provision." (Policy, p. 22) . 
Yet "this provision" follows a seven-clause sentence expressing 
numerous concepts. Either the term "this provision" refers to the 
entire preceding arbitration section, or, employing Metropolitan's 
15 
theory of parsing, parties are bound only by awards made pursuant 
to the last thought immediately preceding the term "this 
provision." Obviously, Metropolitan would not claim that to be its 
intent. 
In light of the inconsistent usage of the word "provision" by 
Metropolitan itself, it seems unreasonable to expect the average 
insured to discern what the policy means with respect to "this 
provision" in the uninsured motorist context. The policy is 
ambiguous, and should be construed against Metropolitan. 
As its secondary position, Metropolitan asserts that Nielsen 
has waived his right to claim coverage in an amount exceeding 
$250,000. Support for this proposition consists largely of the 
Barbara Maw affidavit, which is improperly raised for the first 
time as an attachment to Metropolitan7s brief, and unsupported 
discussions of what Metropolitan says Nielsen intended. (See 
Metropolitan's Brief, pp. 24, 26.) 
Metropolitan focuses on the assertion that Nielsen had an 
opportunity to present his claim for full coverage prior to or 
during the trial and failed to do so. Therefore, Metropolitan 
claims Nielsen has waived his right to make such arguments. 
Metropolitan implies that the "trial" was to resolve Metropolitan's 
liability, which was not the case. The trial was only to decide 
the personal injury claim against the tort feasors O'Reilly and 
16 
French, i.e. the fault of the accident and the amount of Nielsen's 
damages. The jury was not asked to determine Metropolitan's 
liability. Metropolitan was not even on the verdict form. 
The liability of Metropolitan was decided by the judge after 
the "trial." All of these issues on appeal were raised and briefed 
before the trial court ruled on Metropolitan's liability. In fact, 
it was impossible for the trial judge to even address 
Metropolitan's liability until after the personal injury trial. 
The overriding factor, however, is that Metropolitan has not 
alleged or established any of the elements of waiver, namely, 
knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Morgan v. 
Ouailbrook Condominium Co. , 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). Metropolitan 
offers no reason for why the extent of its policy limits was an 
issue required to be established before the personal injury trial, 
particularly when it refused to offer Nielsen even the $250,000 
which it claims to be the limit. Furthermore, Metropolitan's own 
arguments are inconsistent, precluding the company from relying 
upon Nielsen's alleged inconsistencies to establish waiver. 
As a final note, it should be noted that all of the citations 
by Metropolitan in its waiver argument refer to Nielsen's counsel. 
Utah law is clear that an attorney cannot waive substantive rights 
of his client, Mecham v. Benson. 590 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 1979), and 
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therefore such comments would not be binding upon Nielsen in any 
event. 
III. NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT DUE UNDER HIS UM 
COVERAGE. 
Nielsen submits that pre-judgment interest should be awarded 
on the amount due under his contract with Metropolitan, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. As in any other contract claim, the fact 
that Metropolitan contests its liability or the amount due does not 
relieve the company of paying pre-judgment interest on the amount 
the court finds owing under the contract. 
Metropolitan's sole argument against this point is that 
Nielsen's claim for insurance proceeds is properly characterized as 
a personal injury action, rather than contract, and that the amount 
due was therefore not reasonably calculable prior to trial. 
Metropolitan's argument is directly contradicted by this 
Court's holding in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795 
(Utah 1985). In Beck, this Court held that an insurance company's 
obligation to its insured for uninsured motorist coverage is 
grounded in contract, not tort. When this Court decided Beck, it 
undoubtedly knew that the obligation to pay UM coverage arises out 
of a personal injury accident, but that fact did not change the 
Court's view of the relationship between insured and insurer as 
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based in contract. Metropolitan's obligation to Nielsen is 
contractual. 
Metropolitan attempts to distinguish Beck by arguing that this 
is not an action against an insurance company; lf[n]o suit has been 
filed against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any 
claims been made." This argument is difficult to comprehend. All 
of the issues which this Court is asked to decide in this appeal 
concern Metropolitan's liability to Nielsen under the insurance 
contract. 
Once the contractual nature of Nielsen's relationship with 
Metropolitan is acknowledged, Nielsen's entitlement to pre-judgment 
interest on the sum owing under the contract becomes clear. As 
Metropolitan itself notes in its brief, insurance contracts are 
construed the same as other contracts. In other jurisdictions 
where the relationship between insured and UM insurer is deemed 
contractual, courts have recognized the obligation of UM carriers 
to pay pre-judgment interest on the entire amount of their 
obligation to the insured. See, e.g., Brinkman v. AID Insurance 
Co. , 766 P.2d 1227, 1234-35 (Idaho 1988), and State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Reaves. 292 So.2d 95, 102-03 (Ala. 1974), 
discussed in Nielsen's opening brief. As the Alabama Supreme Court 
stated in Reaves: 
Certainly, there may be disagreements between insurer and 
insured as to how much (or whether any sum) is rightfully 
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due, and that disagreement ultimately may have to be 
settled in a court of law. But such is true of other 
contract actions as well. 
Id. at 103. 
Metropolitan does not refute this case law. Instead, 
Metropolitan argues that the amount owing was not calculable with 
reasonable mathematical certainty. Unfortunately, that argument is 
again based upon the erroneous assertion that Nielsen's claim is 
one for personal injury. Furthermore, it ignores case law cited in 
Nielsen's opening brief. Those cases hold that an insured is 
entitled to pre-judgment interest, even in non-contractual 
situations, where the insurer knew, or should have known, that it 
would have to pay policy limits to the insured. See, e.g., Shafer 
v. Automobile Club International Insurance Exchange, 778 S.W.2d 
395, 399 (Mo.App. 1989); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Bishop, 329 So.2d 670 (Miss. 1976); United Services Automobile 
Association v. Winbeck, 637 P.2d 996 (Wash.App. 1981). 
Metropolitan's response to the principle set forth in such 
cases is to assert that it disputed the damages and its liability 
to Nielsen. It does not follow, however, that Metropolitan's 
refusal to pay under the contract was reasonable or in good faith. 
While Metropolitan's unreasonableness is a separate ground, not a 
prerequisite, for recovery of pre-judgment interest on the contract 
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amount, at the very least this issue is factual which should be 
resolved by a trier of fact. 
In summary, Nielsen is entitled to pre-judgment interest on 
the entire amount this court finds owing under his contract with 
Metropolitan. Nielsen's claim for coverage under the policy is 
grounded in contract, rather than tort, and thus Metropolitan is 
liable for interest as in any other contract action. Even if the 
action were considered one for personal injury, a factual issue 
exists as to whether Metropolitan knew or should have known that 
Nielsen's damages exceeded policy limits. 
IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, NIELSEN IS ENTITLED 
TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE SPECIAL 
DAMAGES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44. 
Nielsen claims, in the alternative, that he is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest on the amount of his special damages, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. Metropolitan argues that 
its obligation to Nielsen is limited solely to the amount of the 
policy limits. Metropolitan's argument is based upon the language 
of the policy, which obligates Metropolitan to pay, 
[A] 11 sums which the insured or his legal representative 
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages because 
of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by 
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or 
use of an uninsured highway vehicle . . . 
(Policy, p. 7). 
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Metropolitan contends that the above language relieves it of 
liability for pre-judgment interest in excess of its policy limits. 
In support of that position, Metropolitan cites an insurance 
treatise and some cases in which the word "damages" is construed to 
include pre-judgment interest. 
Metropolitan's argument ignores the fact that under Utah law, 
insurance contracts are to be construed not in a technical legal 
sense, but rather in accordance with the understanding of the 
average, reasonable purchaser of insurance. Draughon v. Cuna 
Mutual Insurance Co. , 771 P. 2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989) . An ambiguous 
provision regarding liability for interest must be construed in 
favor of the insured, 15A Couch on Insurance 2d § 56:11 (1983) , and 
the reasonable expectations of the insured are to be given effect 
where possible. Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Nowhere in the quoted provision of the Nielsen policy is there 
any language which would lead a reasonable insured to know that the 
limitation applicable to "damages" includes pre-judgment interest. 
The insured certainly cannot obtain such an understanding from the 
definition of "damages" provided in the policy: 
"damages" with respect to bodily injury includes damages 
for care and loss of services resulting therefrom, and 
with respect to property damage, damages for loss of use; 
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(Policy, Definitions for Part 1, p. 4, incorporated by reference 
into Definitions for Part 3f p. 7.) 
Nowhere in that definition, or anywhere else in the policy, is 
there any reference to pre-judgment interest. It is simply not 
reasonable to argue that to an average insured, the limitation on 
the amount Metropolitan would pay for "damages" includes pre-
judgment interest. The policy is not clear on what is meant by 
"damages," and therefore must be construed in favor of Nielsen. 
Regardless of the meaning of the term "damages" in the policy, 
Metropolitan's argument is flawed in two other respects. First, as 
illustrated by the case law cited above, courts have held that an 
insurer's obligation for interest is not restricted by the amount 
of policy limits where the insurer knows, or should know, that the 
insured is entitled to policy limits, but nonetheless refuses to 
pay. (See discussion under Point III, page 20.) Whether 
Metropolitan falls within that category is a factual issue to be 
determined by a trier of fact. 
An additional defect in Metropolitan's argument is the fact 
that interest on special damages is statutorily mandated. 
Insurance contracts must be construed in conformity with the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-35 (1983). Consequently, a provision in an 
insurance policy which conflicts with Utah statutory requirements 
is void or must be construed in accordance with the law. 
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Thus, even if Metropolitan's construction of the contract term 
"damages" were correct, the contract must still provide for the 
payment of statutorily mandated pre-judgment interest on the 
contract obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Nielsen's opening 
brief, Nielsen respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
district court's order of summary judgment, and to remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of Nielsen or to have 
factual issues determined by a trier of fact. 
DATED this 2 $ ^ day of May, 1991. 
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